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AVERTING AN INSIDE JOB: A PROPOSAL TO CHANGE
HOW INSIDERS ARE DEFINED IN THE BANKRUPTCY CODE
ABSTRACT
Are you a business debtor with massive unsecured debts and need your
cramdown plan approved? Just sell the claims to a friend at a massive
discount and have him vote to approve your plan over other creditors’
objections. While this sounds absurd, under current insider jurisprudence in
chapter 11 bankruptcies, this happens.
In most situations, the Bankruptcy Code prohibits insiders of businesses
from seeking preferential treatment from a bankrupt debtor. One way the Code
does this is through excluding an insider’s vote from the plan approval process
in a chapter 11 bankruptcy cramdown. But, if an insider can find a way to
escape the narrow statutory insider definition in the Code, then the usual
prohibitions on insider conduct may not apply.
In addition to the narrow, specified list of statutory insiders in the Code,
courts have crafted various definitions of non-statutory insiders as well. This
lack of uniform and predictable application has thwarted one of bankruptcy’s
main goals: the equitable treatment of creditors. This Comment examines
courts’ conflicting applications of insider rules, with a focus on chapter 11,
and recommends a change to how insiders are defined in the Code to prevent
inequitable outcomes for creditors.
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INTRODUCTION TO CHAPTER 11 AND INSIDERS

A. A Need for a Change
The chapter 11 bankruptcy process allows debtors to retain their assets,
reorganize their debts, and pay off their creditors according to a plan of
reorganization.1 Chapter 11 is utilized primarily by business debtors to
maintain and preserve a functioning company, while modifying otherwise
overwhelming debts, by spreading payments out over a repayment period or
changing the terms of various debts according to a plan.2 Congress has crafted
the Bankruptcy Code (the Code) to ensure that creditors and debtors receive
equitable treatment and to minimize abusive use of Code provisions.3 One area
of potential abuse that Congress addresses through the Code is the area of
insiders.
Insiders are persons (which the Code defines broadly as including
individuals and entities)4 who have clear self-interest in the outcome of a
bankruptcy proceeding, such as directors, officers, or persons in control of a
corporate debtor.5 Because of their close affiliation and personal stake in the
reorganization, insiders are specifically prevented, among other things, from
voting to approve a reorganization plan if they are also creditors holding any
voting claims.6 Under the current statutory scheme, some individuals who
appear to be insiders, but technically do not meet the statutory criteria, are
permitted to vote on a reorganization plan and potentially force an otherwise
non-confirmable plan upon dissenting creditors.7 This Comment will argue that
this practice is abusive and thwarts Congress’s intent to draft a Code that treats
similarly situated creditors equitably.
To address this problem, Congress should amend the Code by changing
how the Code defines “insider.” Rather than the current inclusive list that
allows courts to interpret whether a person fits the strict insider definition
(thereby becoming statutory insiders), or is similar enough to be considered a
non-statutory insider, Congress should define “insider” exclusively. This
1

See U.S. COURTS, BANKRUPTCY BASICS 3 (2d ed. 1998).
Id.
3
See Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act, 109 P.L. 8, 119 Stat. 23, 109 P.L. 8,
2005 Enacted S. 256, 109 Enacted S. 256, drafted primarily to prevent abuse.
4
11 U.S.C. § 101(41) (2012).
5
See id. § 101(31).
6
See id. § 1129(a)(10).
7
See U.S. Bank N.A. v. Vill. at Lakeridge, LLC (In re Vill. at Lakeridge, LLC), 814 F.3d 993, 998
(9th Cir. 2016).
2
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exclusive definition will improve predictability, prevent abusive claim selling
by debtors, and better meet Congress’s goals for chapter 11 bankruptcy.
This Comment proceeds by detailing the chapter 11 process, continues
with an examination of the Code’s current definition of “insider,” and then
explains the background and purposes of chapter 11 bankruptcy. Next, this
Comment will set up the conflict between courts in defining non-statutory
insiders, with some courts taking a liberal view of insiders and others taking a
narrow view, and examine how commentators and courts alike have predicted
future litigation and possible abuse. In the final section, this Comment will
propose a solution that modifies how the Code defines insider so as to prevent
these conflicting interpretations and potential abuses. This Comment will
conclude with an explanation of the mechanics of the new definition’s
application, an examination of the benefits and potential drawbacks of a new
definition, and the issues that will continue to inevitably arise with insider
determinations.
B. The Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Process
1. Restructuring and the Automatic Stay
Chapter 11 bankruptcy provides for debt restructuring of businesses under
a court confirmed plan of reorganization to repay creditors.8 While a chapter 7
bankruptcy proceeding is also available for business debtors, a chapter 11
bankruptcy allows a company to continue to operate during and (hopefully)
after bankruptcy, thus avoiding asset liquidation and closing of the business.9
In a chapter 7, there is no chance of saving the business because all of the
debtor company’s assets are liquidated to satisfy its debts.10 Under a chapter
11, the debtor maintains the business and its assets and “may seek an
adjustment of debts, either by reducing the debt or by extending the time for
repayment, or may seek a more comprehensive reorganization.11“ Even if a
debtor is not able to emerge successfully from a chapter 11 bankruptcy, the
debtor is nonetheless protected by the automatic stay12 from the time the debtor

8

11 U.S.C. § 1129 (2012).
See BANKRUPTCY BASICS, supra note 1, at 3.
10
See id. at 11.
11
Id.
12
11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (2012). Other than an ultimate discharge, the automatic stay is the greatest
protection provided by bankruptcy and a major objective in and of itself for debtors. The automatic stay
prevents creditors from taking many actions, including attempting to collect debts from the debtor,
repossessing property from a debtor, and enforcing liens against any of the creditor’s property.
9
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files the petition until discharge, dismissal, or conversion to chapter 7.13 This at
least gives the debtor a significant amount of time14 to try to save the business
by providing a “breathing spell . . . during which negotiations can take place to
try to resolve the difficulties in the debtor’s financial situation.”15 Ultimately, if
a business is insolvent, but management is determined to continue operating in
order to eventually salvage the company, chapter 11 is likely the proper choice.
2. Classifying Claims, Impairment, and Voting
The chapter 11 process involves preparing a reorganization plan,
identifying creditor claims, determining if claims are impaired, and claim
voting to approve or disapprove the plan. To begin a chapter 11 bankruptcy, a
business files a petition with the bankruptcy court where the business is
domiciled.16 A chapter 11 debtor, known as a debtor in possession,17 must file
a number of additional documents and schedules that give creditors and the
courts an understanding of the business’s financial situation.18 One critical
document that the debtor in possession must file is a plan of reorganization,
which specifically proposes how the debtor intends to modify its debts based
on the type of each creditor’s claims.19 The debtor’s plan must assemble each
creditor’s claim, defined broadly in the Code as a “right to payment,20“ into a
class.21 Each claim represents a creditor’s right to vote in the ultimate
acceptance or rejection of a plan,22 so each creditor may have a number of
claims based on distinct rights to payment.

13

11 U.S.C. §§ 362(c)(2)(A)–(C) (2012).
See id. § 1121. From the time a debtor files a chapter 11 petition they have an exclusive 120-day
period to file a plan of reorganization, which under certain circumstances may be extended by a court to up to
18 months.
15
BANKRUPTCY BASICS, supra note 1, at 27.
16
Id. at 2.
17
Id. at 25.; 11 U.S.C. § 1107(a) (2012). A “debtor in possession” under chapter 11 is the term used to
describe the debtor who is performing the requirements of bankruptcy while also retaining possession of
property of the estate and other assets. This is in contrast with other chapters, such as chapter 7, where a trustee
is assigned to manage the process on behalf of the debtor as a disinterested third party.
18
See BANKRUPTCY BASICS, supra note 1, at 25.; 11 U.S.C. § 1121(a) (2012). The debtor files a plan.
11 U.S.C. § 1125 (2012). The debtor must also provide a written disclosure statement that provides “adequate
information” of the debtor’s financial situation.
19
BANKRUPTCY BASICS, supra note 1, at 25.
20
11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(A) (2012). The Code uses a broad definition of claim which encompasses almost
any right to payment, “whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed,
contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured;”
21
Id. § 1123(a)(1).
22
See id. § 1129(a) (describing that each “holder of a claim or interest” gets to vote to accept a plan of
reorganization).
14
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In addition to classifying claims, the Code specifies that a plan must
provide for equal treatment of each class of claims and provide “adequate
means for the plan’s implementation.”23 The plan must also specify each class
of claims as either impaired or unimpaired.24 In essence, impaired claims are
those claims held by creditors who are getting a proposed amount that is less
than what was initially bargained for.25 As § 1124(a)(1) puts it, a creditor’s
claim under the plan is not impaired if the plan “leaves unaltered the legal,
equitable, and contractual rights to which such claim or interest entitles the
holder of such claim or interest,”26 or otherwise restores the claim to its
unaltered state.27 Therefore, depending on the treatment of each creditor’s
claim, it will be classified in the debtor’s plan as either impaired or
unimpaired.28
The Code specifies that unimpaired claims are presumed to have accepted
the plan because these creditors are getting the full benefit of their bargain.29
Thus, unimpaired claims are not entitled to vote on the plan.30 Claims that
receive no payment are likewise presumed to have rejected the plan, and these
claims are also not entitled to vote.31 Under the plan, any claim holder who
gets more than nothing but less than the full amount of its claim is considered
to have an impaired claim and must vote on the plan with the other claim
holders within their class.32 Impaired claims, therefore, are the target audience
of the debtor’s plan of reorganization because, as we will see, the votes of
these impaired claim holders can ultimately decide whether the business can
successfully reorganize.
23
Id. § 1123(a)(5). The “adequate means” may be almost any disposition of the debtor’s assets, up to
and including complete liquidation. The Code provides a non-exclusive list of these “adequate means”
including retention of property by the debtor, transfer of property by the debtor, merger of the debtor with
another entity, sale of property, satisfaction of a lien, and others.
24
Id. § 1123(a)(2).
25
See id. § 1124.
26
Id. § 1124(1). For example, if a creditor holds an unsecured claim of $5,000 with an interest rate of
5%, payable in 5 years, then this claim will be unimpaired if the debtor’s plan leaves that claim exactly at the
same terms as of the effective date of the plan. Any modification of the contractual rights of that creditor’s
claim, even more favorable adjustment, will make the claim impaired.
27
Id. §§ 1124(2)(A)–(E). This provision generally deals with situations where a debt has been
accelerated due to a debtor default. If the default is cured (A) the maturity is reinstated as it originally existed;
(B) any damages as result of the claim holder’s reliance on the acceleration are compensated; (C) any
nonmonetary obligations are compensated; (D) and the claim is not otherwise modified; (E) then the claim will
be deemed to be unimpaired.
28
Id. § 1124.
29
Id. § 1126(f).
30
See id.
31
See id. § 1126(g).
32
Id. § 1126(a).
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Once a claim has been labeled as impaired or unimpaired under § 1124,
titled “Impairment of claims or interest,” the claim will be put into a class
according to § 1122, titled “Classification of claims or interests.”33 Section
1122 requires that a plan “may place a claim . . . in a particular class only if
such claim . . . is substantially similar to the other claims” within the same
class.34 Because the substantially similar requirement is not defined in the
Code, the bankruptcy courts have been left to interpret its meaning; the courts
have “broad discretion in matters of classification.”35
Generally, courts interpret the substantially similar requirement by
evaluating “the legal attributes of the claims, not who holds them,” focusing on
how the “legal character of claim relates to debtor’s assets and whether claims
exhibit similar effect on the bankruptcy estate.”36 While all claims in a class
must be substantially similar, not all claims that are substantially similar are
required to be placed in the same class.37 Debtors are given some latitude to
classify similar claims in different classes, so long as the purpose for the
different classification is not manipulation of voting.38
Once claims have been classified based on their nature, the class must then
vote on the plan.39 This voting proceeds under § 1126, titled “Acceptance of
plan” which governs the requirements of voting to approve or reject a plan.40
For a class to accept a plan, two conditions must be met. First, two-thirds or
more of the value of the class must approve the plan.41 Second, more than onehalf in number of claims in the class who are impaired must approve the plan42.
If both the value (two-thirds) of the “yes” votes and number (one-half) of “yes”
votes meets these conditions, the class will be deemed to have accepted the

33

Id. §§ 1122(a)–(b).
Id. § 1122(a).
35
Hanson v. First Bank of S.D., N.A., 828 F.2d 1310, 1313 (8th Cir. 1987).
36
In re Tribune Co., 476 B.R. 843, 855 (Bankr. D. Del. 2012) (citing W.R. Grace & Co., 475 B.R. 34
(D. Del 2012)).
37
Hanson, 828 F.2d at 1313.
38
See id. The Court in Hanson noted that debtors’ discretion is not unlimited. A debtor cannot
manipulate the classes to create one class of approving claims to force overall approval of a plan through a
cramdown proceeding.
39
See 11 U.S.C. § 1126(a) (2012).
40
Id. § 1126.
41
Id.
42
Id.
34
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plan.43 Only those claims that actually cast a vote count toward the requisite
one-half and two-thirds calculation.44
Once all claims have been voted, the next step is plan confirmation under
§ 1129, titled “Confirmation of plan.”45 This section states that for the overall
plan to be confirmed, all of the impaired classes must accept the plan under
§ 1129(a)(8).46 Once the classes of impaired claims have accepted the plan, a
bankruptcy judge must evaluate the plan and confirm it as long as it meets the
other requirements of § 1129(a).47 This subsection has fifteen requirements for
plan confirmation, only one of which is plan acceptance by the impaired
classes.48 The other significant requirements include that the plan and the
proponent comply with applicable provisions of the Code, that the plan has
been proposed in good faith, that the debtor has disclosed the identities and
affiliations of any individuals proposed to serve in key management positions
after confirmation, and that each impaired class receive a certain minimum
amount of payment in the plan, among others.49
Of these many requirements, the key provision for the purposes of this
Comment, in addition to § 1129(a)(8) requiring class acceptance, is under
subsection (a)(10), which states “[i]f a class of claims is impaired under the
plan, at least one class of claims that is impaired under the plan has accepted
the plan, determined without including any acceptance of the plan by any
insider.”50 Ultimately, under a § 1129(a) confirmation, the court will approve a
plan if, in addition to the technical and statutory requirements, the debtor can
create a restructured debt situation that is financially acceptable to a majority
of its creditors, as evidenced by each class’s approval of the plan under
§ 1129(a)(8).51

43

Id.
See id. If a class has ten claims, each valued at $100, and each claim holder casts a vote, then at least
six must approve of the plan and the value of the approval votes must equal at least $700. Practically then, the
plan must garner seven approval votes in that class to be accepted. However, if only three claim holders cast a
vote, then only two yes votes are required to approve a plan for that class.
45
See id. § 1129. This section governs how the bankruptcy court confirms a plan. If all the requirements
of subsection (a) or (b) are met, then the court “shall” confirm the plan.
46
Id. § 1129(a)(8)(A).
47
Id. § 1129(b)(1).
48
Id. §§ 1129(a)(1)–(16).
49
See id.
50
Id. § 1129(a)(10).
51
Id. § 1129(a). The statute states that a court “shall” confirm the plan if the requirements of subsection
(a) are met, this removes any discretion of the court.
44
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3. The Cramdown
If all classes do not approve the plan, the debtor is not out of luck; a
cramdown is possible. So long as one class of creditors approves a plan, a
court may confirm a plan as a “cramdown”52 under § 1129(b). In a cramdown,
the Code removes the requirement of § 1129(a)(8)—requiring the approval of
all classes—leaving only § 1129(a)(10) as the class voting standard. This
alternate approval standard requires only one impaired class to accept a plan to
move on to confirmation so long as the plan meets two additional “fairness”
requirement.53 All other requirements of the typical confirmation proceeding
under § 1129(a) remain, but the proponent must show compliance with the
additional provisions of § 1129(b).54
These additional provisions set a higher standard for the treatment of the
non-accepting classes.55 Where under subsection (a) the plan was required to
only have a good faith standard and meet the additional statutory minimums,
subsection (b) requires that, with respect to the non-approving classes, the plan
“does not discriminate unfairly, and is fair and equitable, with respect to each
class of claims or interests that is impaired under, and has not accepted, the
plan.”56 Subsection (b) imposes these additional requirements on the debtor to
ensure that a cramdown plan treats secured claim holders, unsecured claim
holders, and interest holders in a more favorable manner based on their type of
claim.57
This higher standard of favorable treatment proposed in the plan is that the
plan must be (1) fair and equitable and (2) must not discriminate unfairly with
regard to the classes being crammed down against.58 The Code specifically
defines what it considers fair and equitable treatment, but does not define how
courts are to evaluate whether the plan discriminates unfairly.59 For example, if
a secured claim holder is being crammed down against, to be considered fair
and equitable under § 1129(b)(2)(A) the plan must provide:
(i)(I) that the holders of such claims retain the liens securing such
claims, whether the property subject to such liens is retained by the

52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59

See id. § 1129(a)(8); H.R. 95-595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
Id. § 1129(a)(8).
Id. § 1129(b).
See id.
Id. § 1129(b)(1).
See id. §§ 1129(b)(2)(A)–(C).
Id.
Id.
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debtor or transferred to another entity, to the extent of the allowed
amount of such claims; and
(II) that each holder of a claim of such class receive on account of
such claim deferred cash payments totaling at least the allowed
amount of such claim, of a value, as of the effective date of the plan,
of at least the value of such holder’s interest in the estate’s interest in
such property;
(ii) for the sale, subject to section 363(k) of this title, or any property
that is subject to the liens securing such claims, free and clear of such
liens, with such liens to attach to the proceeds of such sale, and the
treatment of such liens on proceeds under clause (i) or (iii) of this
subparagraph; or
(iii) for the realization by such holders of the indubitable equivalent
of such claims.60

This high standard of fair and equitable, although relatively complicated,
ensures that holders of claims being crammed down against receive at least a
minimum amount of their claim (for secured claims) or receive some amount
at the expense of junior claim holders (for unsecured claims).61
When it comes to the requirement that the plan must not discriminate
unfairly against a class being crammed down against, the Code provides no
definition and has left it up to the courts to define.62 One bankruptcy court in
the Southern District of Texas has adopted a popular definition from well
renowned bankruptcy scholar Bruce Markell.63 This test was described in In re
Sentry Operating Co of Tex. Inc. as follows:
. . . a [c]hapter 11 plan is presumptively subject to denial of
confirmation on the basis of unfair discrimination, even though it
provides fair and equitable treatment for all classes, when there is (1)
a dissenting class; (2) another class of the same priority; and (3) a
difference in the plan’s treatment of the two classes that results in
either (a) a materially lower percentage recovery for the dissenting
class (measured in terms of the net present value of all payments), or
(b) regardless of percentage recovery, an allocation under the plan of

60

Id. § 1129(b)(2)(A).
See id. § 1129(b)(2)(A)–(C).
62
See In re Sentry Operating Co. of Tex., Inc., 264 B.R. 850, 863–64 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2001) (noting
that “fair and equitable” is defined, but “discriminates unfairly” is not).
63
See id. at 863.
61
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materially greater risk to the dissenting class in connection with its
proposed distribution.64

Ultimately, a debtor is not required to craft a plan that every class accepts.65
However, a plan that is rejected by a class must meet both the higher
cramdown standards examined above66 and every other requirement of
§ 1129(a) to be confirmed.67 In many single asset bankruptcy proceedings (i.e.,
where a debtor owns one large asset, such as an office building), these higher
standards have less practical effect on plan confirmation because there will
usually be only one impaired secured creditor class and one unsecured
impaired class.68
Regardless of the type of debtor, in every cramdown proceeding, as well as
in a regular § 1129(a) proceeding, all claim holders in a class may vote on the
plan except those creditors classified as “insiders.”69 This point becomes more
important under a cramdown because in a typical approval process, where all
classes accept the plan, there is not necessarily a requirement that there be no
insiders in any class, but that only one of the (potentially many) impaired
classes be free of insider votes.70 Thus, being labeled an insider can have a
significant effect on whether a plan is confirmed by the court in a cramdown
proceeding.
C. Insiders and their Difficulties
Currently, the definition of insiders is based on the type of entity of the
debtor and the entity’s relationship to the creditor.71 Insiders are defined in
64
Id. (quoting Bruce A. Markell, A New Perspective on Unfair Discrimination in Chapter 11, 72 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 227 (1998).
65
11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(1) (2012).
66
Id.
67
Id. § 1129(a).
68
Cf. Figter Ltd. v. Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass’n of Am. (In re Figter Ltd.), 118 F.3d 635 (9th Cir.
1997). Where the major secured creditor (Teachers) had a $17 million claim in its class and the only other
impaired class was unsecured with a value of only about $22,500. Here the “fair and equitable” requirement
would require that Teachers retain a lien on the property until paid, which was already part of the debtor’s
plan, while the “unfair discrimination” requirement did not apply because there were no other classes within
the same priority.
69
11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(10) (2012).
70
Compare 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(10) (2012), and 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b) (2012), with 11 U.S.C.
§ 1129(a)(8) (2012). Under a normal approval process, a plan may contain, for example, four impaired classes
of claims. Assuming all four classes reach the required approval levels, there still only must be one of those
four that approves without counting the insider vote. This is different in a cramdown, where the debtor is
forcing the plan onto (potentially many) disapproving creditors. Here the one and only accepting class, must
also be the class that is free of insider votes.
71
11 U.S.C. § 101(31) (2012).
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§ 101(31) by listing examples of insiders based on the kind of legal entity of
the debtor.72 If the debtor is an individual, an insider is defined as a “(i) relative
of the debtor or a general partner of the debtor; (2) partnership in which the
debtor is a general partner; (iii) general partner of the debtor; or (iv)
corporation of which the debtor is a director, officer or person in control.”73
The Code continues by defining an insider of a corporation as a “(i) director of
the debtor; (ii) officer of the debtor; (iii) person in control of a debtor; (iv)
partnership in which the debtor is a general partnership; (v) general partner of
the debtor; or (vi) relative of a general partner, director, officer or person in
control of the debtor.”74 The Code continues with similar definitions if the
debtor is a partnership, a municipality, an affiliate, or managing agent of the
debtor.75
The Code defines insiders in a non-exclusive way by using the word
“includes” in the definition.76 The use of “includes” means that the list of
insiders outlined above is not exclusive, but rather only examples, thus leaving
the courts with discretion to interpret into the Code additional examples that
sufficiently meet the statute’s intent.77 As a result, insiders are generally
grouped as “statutory” if they clearly fit into the defined categories listed in the
Code and as “non-statutory” if they do not neatly fit into a specified category.78
There has been significant debate about what constitutes non-statutory
insiders, with some courts using a limited definition and some a more
expansive definition.79 For example in Butler v. Shaw, which is examined more
in depth later, the Fourth Circuit crafted a limited definition requiring a party
have significant control of the debtor to be considered an insider for voting
purposes.80 This narrow view is contrasted with In re Three Flint Hill, where a
friend and business associate of a partnership was deemed to be an insider for
voting purposes despite not fitting neatly into the statutory definition.81 These
conflicting interpretations raise confusion and arguably thwart Congress’s

72

Id.
Id. § 101(31)(A).
74
Id. § 101(31)(B).
75
Id. § 101(31).
76
Id.
77
Rupp v. United Sec. Bank (In re Kunz), 489 F.3d 1072, 1078 (10th Cir. 2007).
78
Holly Estes, Transfer of a Claim Held by Insider Does Not an Insider Make, 35 AM. BANKR. INST. J.
106, Apr. 2016 at 34, 106.
79
See Michael Lichtenstein, Who Is an Insider For Voting Purposes in a Single Asset Chapter 11?, 10
J. BANKR. L & PRAC. 279, 281 (2001).
80
See id.
81
Id. at 286.
73
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goals of having a well-crafted and equitable chapter 11 process because it
creates a lack of predictability and uniformity in reorganizations.
D. A Solution to the Insider Problem
Congress should change how an insider is defined in the Code.
Specifically, § 101(31) should be amended by removing the word “includes”
and adding a provision that defines an insider as “any individual with close
personal or financial relationships with the debtor that, as a result of a less than
arm’s length transaction, raises a presumption that the individual is beholden to
the debtor.” This presumption should be rebuttable, thereby shifting the burden
to the would-be insider to present evidence that the transaction was legitimate.
This combination of changes will result in an exclusive definition which
eliminates the need for courts to classify some insiders as “non-statutory” but
still provides flexibility for courts to make a fact-intensive inquiry.82 The
proposed change will also cast a wider net by having a statutorily set
definition, and will reduce the potential for abusive claim sales while
furthering Congress’s broad intent of treating similarly situated creditors
similarly.83
II. BACKGROUND LEGAL DOCTRINES AND CURRENT STATE OF CASE LAW
A. Equitable Distribution and Claim Selling
There are two fundamental background legal doctrines and a series of cases
that will help frame this issue and establish the current legal situation regarding
bankruptcy insiders. These overarching principles are (1) equitable
distribution84 and (2) the buying and selling of creditor claims.85 Both are
interwoven into most insider cases.
The first, equitable distribution, is a fundamental principle of bankruptcy
with specific salience in chapter 11 contexts. This is because the definitive goal
of a restructuring is to “provide fair remedies to creditors generally,” which
includes an equitable distribution of debtor’s assets to creditors through a valid

82
See In re Vill. at Lakeridge, LLC, 814 F.3d at 1000. The court noted that whether a creditor is an
insider is factual inquiry that courts must conduct each time there is a claim that a party is a non-statutory
insider. This fact intensive inquiry cannot be bypassed as a matter of law under the current definition.
83
See In re Kunz, 489 F.3d at 1079.
84
Id. at 1074.
85
See In re Figter Ltd., 118 F.3d 635 (describing the acceptability of claims buying and selling under
certain conditions).
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plan of debt restructuring and payments.86 The Tenth Circuit, in Rupp v. United
Security Bank (In re Kunz), explained that a goal of adherence to the equitable
distribution principle is to “prevent, within limits, a debtor from giving
preferred treatment to some creditors in derogation of the interests of other,
similarly situated creditors.”87 The Code specifically requires this equal
treatment in a chapter 11 context in § 1123, which, in part, requires that a plan
“provide the same treatment for each claim or interest of a particular class,
unless the holder of a particular claim or interest agrees to a less favorable
treatment of such claim or interest.”88 Thus, without an acceptably fair and
equitable distribution of a debtor’s assets under a chapter 11 plan, no creditors
will vote to accept the plan and it is unlikely to be confirmed.89
The second essential background doctrine is claim buying and selling.90
Claim buying occurs when a creditor or third party purchases the claims of
other creditors to secure the voting rights of those claims under a chapter 11
bankruptcy.91 In Figter Ltd. v. Teachers Ins. Annuity Ass’n of Am (In re
Figter), the Ninth Circuit clearly authorized these purchases for legitimate
purposes.92 In Figter, the owner of an apartment development filed for chapter
11 bankruptcy and as part of its restructuring plan sought to convert the
apartments into condominiums against Teachers Insurance Annuity
Association of America’s (Teachers) wishes.93 Despite their objections, Figter
intended to cramdown against Teachers (which held a $17.9 million secured
claim) by gaining approval of the remaining creditors.94
If these remaining creditors approved the plan, regardless of the amount of
their collective claims, the plan could be crammed down against Teachers.95
These creditors all held comparatively small unsecured claims, and the value
of these claims in total was approximately $22,500.96 To prevent Figter’s
86

In re Kunz, 489 F.3d at 1074–75.
Id. at 1075.
88
11 U.S.C. § 1123(a)(4) (2012).
89
See id. § 1129 (listing the requirements for a confirmable plan, including acceptance by creditors).
90
See generally In re Figter Ltd., 118 F.3d 635.
91
Cf. id. (Teachers Insurance and Annuity Association of America purchased unsecured claims of other
creditors to increase its voting stake in Figter’s chapter 11 reorganization.).
92
Id. at 639.
93
Id. at 637.
94
Id.
95
See 11 U.S.C. § 1129 (2012) (allowing a plan to be confirmed in the face of a disapproving creditor if
at least one impaired class votes to approve the plan).
96
In re Figter Ltd., 118 F.3d at 637. Here, Teachers purchased twenty-one of thirty-four claims (after
offering to buy all of them) valued at approximately $15,000, making the total amount of all thirty-four claims
somewhere in the range of $15,000 to $22,500.
87
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cramdown against them, Teachers offered to purchase all of these unsecured
claims (at a higher price than in Figter’s chapter 11 plan) and thereby obtain
the votes of each claim to vote against Figter’s plan.97 Teachers was able to
purchase twenty-one of the thirty-four unsecured claims,98 which was enough
in number and value to prevent Figter’s cramdown.99
The Figter court allowed Teachers to block this cramdown plan so long as
the claims were not purchased in “bad faith” or for an “ulterior motive.”100
Figter argued that the mere fact that Teachers purchased the unsecured claims
for the express purpose of preventing the plan’s confirmation was evidence of
bad faith.101 The court rejected this argument.102 Bad faith, the court reasoned,
would be present if a debtor’s competitor or some other third party purchased
these claims to block the confirmation, but in this case the purchasing party
was already a creditor and was seeking to advance its own interests in its “fair
share of the debtor’s estate.103“
Figter also argued that Teachers should only be allowed one vote despite
purchasing twenty-one claims.104 This argument was similarly rejected because
the Code specifically provides that votes are tallied by claims rather than by
creditors, so the fact that one creditor held twenty-one claims did not preclude
that creditor from voting twenty-one times.105 Ultimately, the court approved
claim selling and purchasing so long as the motive of the purchaser is not bad
faith.106 This decision paved the way for future claim selling and the concept is
important in the context of insiders as discussed below in the Lakeridge
case.107

97

Id.
Id.
99
See 11 U.S.C. § 1126(c) (2012). As stated previously, this provision requires greater than one-half in
number and at least two-thirds in dollar amount of a class to approve a plan. Teacher’s twenty-one purchased
claims valued at nearly $15,000 was sufficient to prevent this approval.
100
In re Figter Ltd., 118 F.3d at 639.
101
Id. at 638.
102
Id. at 641.
103
Id. at 639.
104
Id. at 641.
105
Id.
106
Id. at 640.
107
See In re Vill. at Lakeridge, LLC, 814 F.3d at 999–1000. In this case, claims are validly purchased by
a third-party.
98
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B. Competing Interpretations of Insiders in the Courts
In addition to the principles of equitable distribution and claim selling,
there are a significant number of cases (detailed below) that exemplify the
competing and non-uniform interpretations among courts when resolving cases
with insider issues.108 Generally, courts either interpret the insider definition
narrowly or broadly. Courts that narrowly define insiders tend to be more
common in the chapter 11 context, such as the Ninth Circuit in In re
Lakeridge.109 However, a few courts, such as the bankruptcy court for
Maryland, do not follow this trend. There the court, in a chapter 11 proceeding,
interpreted the non-statutory insider definition broadly in In re Three Flint Hill
Ltd. P’ship.110
Issues with insiders arise in areas of bankruptcy outside of the chapter 11
cramdown context as well.111 Courts have similarly struggled with competing
interpretations of non-statutory insiders, but in these non-chapter 11 contexts,
courts tend to have a broader insider interpretation.112 Examples of this more
inclusive interpretation of insider include, Schubert v. Lucent Tech. Inc. (In re
Winstar Commc’n), and Unencumbered Assets Trust v. JP Morgan Chase
Bank (In re Nat’l Century Fin. Enters.),113 which both concern voiding asset
transfers to insiders made on the verge of a bankruptcy filing.114 However, the
Fourth and Tenth Circuits buck this trend as well, as exemplified in Butler v.
Shaw Inc., and in Rupp. v. United Sec. Bank (In re Kunz).115 In these cases, the
courts narrowly interpreted the insider definition.116 After an examination of

108
Compare In re Vill. at Lakeridge, LLC, 814 F.3d at 999–1001, with Schubert v. Lucent Tech., Inc.
(In re Winstar Commc’n., Inc.), 2003 Bankr. LEXIS 766, at *24–27 (U.S. Bankr. D. Del. May 29, 2003).
109
See generally In re Vill. at Lakeridge, LLC, 814 F.3d 993. This case is illustrative of courts that
narrowly define non-statutory insiders in the chapter 11 context, finding that a purported insider who
purchased claims in order to effectuate a cramdown was not an insider.
110
Three Flint Hill Ltd. P’shp. v. Prudential Ins. Co. (In re Three Flint Hill Ltd. Pshp.), 213 B.R. 292,
299 (D. Md. 1997).
111
11 U.S.C. § 547 (2012); 11 U.S.C. § 548 (2012).
112
See Anistine v. Carl Zeiss Meditec AG (In re U.S. Medical, Inc.), 531 F.3d 1272, 1279 (10th Cir.
2008).
113
See Rich Mullen, You Asked Your Buddy to Do What? Non-Statutory Insiders and Vote Designation,
THE WEIL BANKRUPTCY BLOG, https://business-finance-restructuring.weil.com; see also Unencumbered
Assets Trust v. JP Morgan Chase Bank (In re Nat’l Century Fin. Enters.), 604 F. Supp. 2d. 1128, 1162 (So.
Dist. OH 2009). This blog post examines a chapter 11 case citing support from non-chapter 11 cases, and In re
Nat’l exemplifies a non-chapter 11 transfer voiding case, which will be further examined below.
114
See 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (2012). This provision allows a trustee (the administrator of a chapter 7
liquidation) to void any transfer of property made to an insider within one year of the debtor’s filing date.
115
Butler v. David Shaw, Inc., 72 F.3d 437 (4th Cir. 1996); In re Kunz, 489 F.3d at 1074.
116
See Butler, 72 F.3d at 442; see also In re Kunz, 489 F.3d at 1079.
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these cases, it will become clear that this body of law is unpredictable and not
uniformly applied.
1. Lakeridge and Narrow Insider Definitions
The first case this Comment will examine is U.S. Bank N.A. v. Vill. at
Lakeridge, LLC (In re Vill. at Lakeridge, LLC).117 The 2016 Lakeridge
decision is a prominent example of a court’s narrow interpretation of the
Code’s definition of insider. In Lakeridge, the most recent case weighing in on
the insider debate, the Ninth Circuit determined that a person with a close
personal relationship with an insider who purchases a greatly discounted claim
does not become a statutory or non-statutory insider as a result.118 The
Lakeridge court also held that a claim-purchasing creditor does not become an
insider solely by receiving a claim from an insider.119 This 2016 decision was
significant because it established relatively clear rules for what a non-statutory
insider (at least in the Ninth Circuit) is not, but the court did not clearly define
what conduct it would consider worthy of an insider determination.120
The Village at Lakeridge LLC was a company that owned and managed a
commercial real estate development in Reno, Nevada.121 Lakeridge purchased
the development in 2004 with a package of loans provided by Greenwich
Financial Products and MBP Equity Partners.122 U.S. Bank subsequently
acquired the promissory note, valued at approximately $10 million, from
Greenwich Financial.123 MBP Equity Partners, LLC, the sole member of
Villages at Lakeridge, LLC, financed and held the remaining debt valued at
approximately $2.76 million.124 In June 2011, Lakeridge filed for chapter 11
bankruptcy disclosing both U.S. Bank and MBP as its only two creditors with
U.S. Bank having a fully secured $10 million claim and MBP having an
unsecured $2.76 million claim.125 Months later, MBP sold their $2.76 million
claim for $5,000.126 MBP’s board, knowing that it would be unable to vote to
approve the Lakeridge chapter 11 plan as an insider, approved the sale of this

117

In re Vill. at Lakeridge, LLC, 814 F.3d 993.
Id. at 1003.
119
See generally In re Vill. at Lakeridge, LLC, 814 F.3d 993.
120
Id. at 1001.
121
Vill. at Lakeridge, LLC v. U.S. Bank N.A. (In re Vill. at Lakeridge, LLC), 2013 Bankr. LEXIS 2329,
at *2 (U.S. B.A.P 9th Cir. 2013).
122
Id.
123
Id.
124
Id.
125
Id.
126
Id. at *2–3.
118
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claim to a close friend of Katherine Bartlett, a board member of MBP.127 This
claim was sold to Dr. Rabkin, who had admittedly close personal and business
relationships with Ms. Bartlett.128 Interestingly, during Dr. Rabkin’s
deposition, U.S. Bank, through counsel, offered to purchase Dr. Rabkin’s
claim for $50,000 and $60,000; both offers were rejected.129
U.S. Bank argued that this claim should be disallowed for voting purposes
under the cramdown procedure of § 1129(a)(10) because Dr. Rabkin was either
a non-statutory insider, became a statutory insider by purchasing the claim
directly from an insider, or the claim was purchased in bad faith.130 The
bankruptcy court found that Rabkin was not a non-statutory insider because
“(a) Dr. Rabkin does not exercise control over the Debtor; (b) Dr. Rabkin does
not cohabit with Ms. Bartlett and does not pay Ms. Bartlett’s bills or living
expenses; (c) Dr. Rabkin has never purchased expensive gifts for Ms.
Bartlett.”131 The bankruptcy court further found the claim was not assigned to
Rabkin in bad faith.132 Ultimately though, the bankruptcy judge ruled that the
claim was not entitled to vote because by purchasing the claim from MBP,
Rabkin acquired “the same status as a statutory insider when he purchased the
claim.”133 Lakeridge and U.S. Bank appealed to the Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy
Appellate Panel, which overturned the bankruptcy court’s finding that Rabkin
became a statutory insider solely by assignment of an insider claim.134 U.S
Bank appealed to the Ninth Circuit.135
The majority of the Ninth Circuit adopted the reasoning of the Bankruptcy
Appellate Panel and held that: (a) Rabkin did not acquire insider status solely
by purchasing the claim from an insider,136 and (b) Rabkin was not a nonstatutory insider because his relationship with Bartlett was not sufficiently
close to “compare with any category listed in § 101(31).”137 The factual
examination of Bartlett and Rabkin’s relationship, which is triggered by

127

Id. at *2.
Id. at *3–4.
129
Id. at *4.
130
Id. at *37.
131
Id. at *18. Although these factual finding seem odd, apparently these facts indicate that Rabkin and
Bartlett were not in a relationship that resembles a marriage or other close family connection.
132
Id. at *26.
133
Id. at *19.
134
Id. at *23.
135
In re Vill. at Lakeridge, LLC, 814 F.3d 993.
136
Id. at 999.
137
Id. at 1003.
128
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Rabkin’s potential non-statutory insider status, failed to raise enough concerns
for the Ninth Circuit to deem Rabkin an insider.138
Judge Clifton disagreed with the majority’s refusal to classify Rabkin as an
insider.139 Judge Clifton accepted the legal conclusion that “a person does not
necessarily become a statutory insider solely by acquiring a claim from a
statutory insider,” but disagreed with the majority’s willingness to discharge
Rabkin from the non-statutory category based on the facts presented.140 Judge
Clifton noted that Rabkin paid only $5,000 for a $2.76 million claim, there was
no offer made to anyone but Rabkin, there was no negotiation over the price,
and that Rabkin apparently knew nothing about the financial worthiness of the
offer.141 To Judge Clifton, Rabkin should have been deemed an insider.142 He
argued that because the claim sale between MBP and Rabkin met the
requirement of a less than arm’s length transaction and because Bartlett and
Rabkin had a close personal relationship that there was clear concern about the
legitimacy of the deal.143 In the end, Rabkin’s vote was allowed and Lakeridge
successfully crammed down against U.S. Bank, thus paving the way for plan
confirmation.144
In addition to this recent case, there are other cases where courts have
defined insiders narrowly. In Butler v. Shaw Inc., the Fourth Circuit interpreted
an insider definition narrowly, finding that to become a non-statutory insider,
one must exercise “sufficient authority over the debtor to unqualifiedly dictate
corporate policy and the disposition of corporate assets.”145 Butler sought to
void a transfer of money he made to Shaw Inc.146 Butler owned a struggling
car dealership and as part of a deal to prevent failure of the business, Shaw (the
former owner of the dealership and current owner of the real property)
liquidated a portion of his ownership in the dealership to Butler.147 Butler then
used that cash to pay the arrearage of the rent and other payments that were
due.148

138
139
140
141
142
143
144
145

See id. at 1002.
Id. at 1003 (Clifton, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1004 (Clifton, J., dissenting).
Id. (Clifton, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1006 (Clifton, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1006–07.
Id. at 1003.
Butler, 72 F.3d at 442. (citing In re Babcock Dairy Co, 70 Bankr. 662, 666 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio

1986)).
146
147
148

Id. at 440.
Id.
Id. at 439.
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Butler subsequently filed for bankruptcy and the trustee attempted to void
the transfers to Shaw Inc. under a theory that Shaw was an insider of the debtor
by being an affiliate of Butler or by having a close relationship with Butler as a
former owner.149 If found to be an insider, the court could have voided any
transfer made within one year of the bankruptcy filing under § 547.150 The
court rejected the affiliate argument because, at the time of the transfer, Shaw
was not an affiliate as defined in the Code because he had ceased to be an
affiliate the day prior to the challenged transfers.151 The Fourth Circuit rejected
Butler’s second argument, that Shaw was an insider based on his close
relationship with Butler, because the court believed that to be a non-statutory
insider, the alleged creditor-insider must have a significant level of control
over the debtor.152 Even though Shaw retained the title of manager at the car
dealership,153 the court believed that he did not exercise sufficient control over
the company and was therefore not an insider.
Lakeridge and Butler are just two examples of courts’ narrow construction
of the non-statutory insider definition in §§ 1129 and 547, respectively. The
final narrow interpretation case is Rupp. v. United Security Bank (In re
Kunz).154 In this chapter 7 case, the Tenth Circuit determined that United
Security Bank was not an insider of a former member (Mr. Kunz) of a bank’s
board of directors despite Kunz’s title of “director emeritus.”155 Here, Mr.
Kunz, a retired banker, filed for chapter 7 bankruptcy and the trustee attempted
to void payments that Mr. Kunz had made to United as part of significant debts
he owed.156 In the year prior to Mr. Kunz’s filing he paid United Bank
approximately $250,000.157 The trustee moved to void these payments under
§ 547(b), which limits preferential transfers on the eve of bankruptcy, because
Mr. Kunz was a director of the bank and therefore the bank was an insider to
Mr. Kunz.158 The Tenth Circuit rejected this argument on the grounds that Mr.
Kunz was a “director emeritus” which was significantly different than a
“director,” and therefore did not meet the statutory criteria of an insider.159 The

149
150
151
152
153
154
155
156
157
158
159

Id. at 440.
11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(4)(B) (2012).
Butler, 72 F.3d at 440.
Id. at 442.
Id. at 440.
In re Kunz, 489 F.3d 1072.
Id. at 1080.
Id. at 1075.
Id. at 1076.
Id. at 1075.
Id. at 1080.
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court further argued that there was not the required element of control present
in the facts to consider United a non-statutory insider.160
2. Three Flint Hill and Broad Interpretations of Insider
While the Ninth, Fourth, and Tenth Circuit Courts issued rulings that
narrowly define insiders, there are those that have rejected a narrow definition
of a non-statutory insider. One significant case where a court broadly
interpreted a claim transferee as an insider as part of its chapter 11 petition is
Three Flint Hill Ltd. P’Ship v. Prudential Ins. Co (In re Three Flint Hill Ltd.
P’ship).161
In Three Flint Hill, the debtor limited partnership (Three Flint Hill) owned
and operated an office building as its sole asset.162 Prudential made a nearly
$20 million loan to Three Flint Hill to finance the building.163 After a few
years, the office building’s only tenant chose not to renew the lease and the
owners were unable to secure a new tenant.164 Three Flint Hill filed a petition
for chapter 11 to prevent foreclosure, and eventually submitted a plan of
reorganization.165
Three Flint Hill’s plan proposed to pay less than half of the amount owed
on the Prudential loan while fully repaying its unsecured creditors within six
months of plan confirmation.166 Not surprisingly, Prudential voted not to
approve this plan, thus requiring a cramdown vote for the unsecured impaired
class of claims.167 Prudential subsequently began the process of purchasing
these remaining claims from the various unsecured creditors.168 At the same
time, Three Flint Hill representatives approached a friendly business associate,
Mr. Bonderman of Tarrant Limited Partnerships (Tarrant), in order to have
Tarrant purchase some of the unsecured claims as well.169 Bonderman and
Tarrant purchased forty-seven claims and voted to approve Three Flint Hill’s
reorganization plan in a cramdown.170

160
161
162
163
164
165
166
167
168
169
170

Id. at 1079.
See In re Three Flint Hill Ltd. P’ship, 213 B.R. 292.
Id. at 295.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 296.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Prudential objected to Tarrant’s vote, arguing that Tarrant and Bonderman
were non-statutory insiders of Three Flint Hill.171 The bankruptcy court and, on
appeal, the U.S. District Court for Maryland agreed that Tarrant was an insider
of Three Flint Hill because Bonderman (as Tarrant’s principal) purchased the
forty-seven claims as a favor to Three Flint Hill and not because he was
making “a carefully reasoned business decision.”172 Thus, Bonderman’s
relationship with Three Flint Hill, when combined with the less than arm’s
length transaction, was sufficient to bring Tarrant within the scope of a nonstatutory insider despite having no control over Three Flint Hill.173
Three Flint Hill directly contrasts with the Lakeridge decision, where the
court found that a similar transaction between a debtor and friendly business
partner did not constitute and insider transaction.174 It is unclear what caused
these courts to come to divergent opinions, but it seems that the courts are left
with significant discretion and a lack of a clear analytical structure when
determining who is or is not an insider based on the Code’s less-than ideal
definition. Interestingly, both courts cite the same Code provision,175 the same
legislative history,176 and even the same case,177 yet came to different
conclusions.
In situations that are outside the chapter 11 claim selling contexts, such as
those that involve the voiding of transfers from debtors to insiders, courts
appear more willing to broadly construe the definition to capture more
insiders.178 Most insider status litigation occurs in this non-chapter 11 arena.179
This alternative instance of the Code’s use of the term “insider” occurs in what
is known as preferential transfer context under § 547(b)(4)(B).180 This section
provides that a trustee (under chapter 7) or debtor-in-possession (under chapter
11) may void a property transfer made within a certain time before the filing of
a bankruptcy petition and bring that property back into the estate.181 Transfers
made to persons other than insiders have a ninety-day reach back window

171
172
173
174
175
176

Id. at 297.
Id. at 298.
Id. at 300.
See In re Vill. at Lakeridge, LLC, 814 F.3d 993.
See 11 U.S.C. § 101(31) (2012).
See 11 U.S.C. §101 (2012); see also S. REP. 95-989, at 25 (1978), as reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787,

5810.
177
178
179
180
181

See In re Friedman, 126 B.R. 63 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. Cal. 1991).
See id.
See In re Gilbert, 104 B.R. 206, 210 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1989).
11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(4)(B) (2012).
Id.
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within which the trustee can void the transfer and bring the property back into
the estate’s possession.182 Alternatively, property transferred to an insider is
recoverable as far back as one year prior to the debtor’s filing.183 The differing
treatment is intended to prevent abuse and stop the debtor from giving, selling,
or otherwise transferring debtor property to an insider on the eve of a
bankruptcy filing.184
The claim transfer avoidance body of law is generally more inclusive in
defining non-statutory insiders and courts evaluate the facts of the debtorclaimholder transaction with a focus on “(1) the closeness of the relationship
between the parties and (2) whether the transaction was negotiated at arm’s
length.”185 The Tenth Circuit has defined in detail the purpose of § 547 of the
Code in In re PERMA PAC. PROPS, when it stated that:
It is the ultimate aim of the preference law in the Bankruptcy Code to
ensure that all creditors receive an equal distribution from the
available assets of the debtor . . . . Although the intent or state of
mind of the parties is not materially dispositive of whether or not a
transfer is a preference . . . we can see no impediment to allowing the
bankruptcy court to look at the nature of the transaction and the
relationship among the parties.186

Cases that have a generally expansive interpretation of insider include
Schubert v. Lucent Tech. Inc. (In re Winstar Commc’n), and Unencumbered
Assets Trust v. JP Morgan Chase Bank (In re Nat’l Century Fin. Enters).187
In Schubert v. Lucent Tech. Inc. (In re Winstar Commc’n), the debtor
Winstar attempted to recover $194 million payment it made to Lucent
Technologies as part of a financing package that was supposed to be used to
expand Lucent’s telecommunication network through a continuing strategic
partnership.188 Lucent quickly defaulted on their payments to Winstar.189
Winstar was subsequently unable to pay its other existing debt obligations
(unrelated to Lucent) and filed for bankruptcy approximately five months after
its Lucent loan.190 Winstar claimed that this transfer of $194 million to Lucent

182
183
184
185
186
187
188
189
190

Id. § 547(b)(4)(A).
Id. § 547(b)(4)(B).
See In re PERMA PAC. PROPS., 983 F.2d 964, 968 (10th Cir. 1992).
Rich Mullen, supra note 113.
In re PERMA PAC. PROPS., 983 F.2d at 968.
See Rich Mullen, supra note 113.
In re Winstar Commc’n., Inc., 2003 Bankr. LEXIS 766, at *24.
Id. at *5–6.
Id. at *6.
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should be avoided as a preferential transfer to an insider.191 Winstar argued that
their relationship with Lucent was sufficiently close and that Lucent
maintained enough control over them financially, that Lucent should be
considered an insider and have the $194 million payment avoided under
§ 547(b)(4)(B).192
Both the bankruptcy court for the District of Delaware and the U.S. District
Court agreed that Lucent was an insider of Winstar under both a statutory and
non-statutory analysis.193 Under a statutory analysis, the bankruptcy court
found that Lucent was a “person in control” of debtor under 101(31)(B)(iii).194
Lucent was a “person in control” because it was able to dictate “Winstar’s
purchasing decisions” and also induce Winstar to transfer the $194 million or it
“would terminate negotiations . . . and refuse further financing.”195
Similarly, under a non-statutory analysis, the district court believed that
Lucent was an insider of Winstar because the relationship was “more than a
mere debtor-creditor relationship conducted at arm’s length,” and also was
“sufficiently close.”196 The district court, extracting this language directly from
the legislative history of the definition of insider as described in Butler v.
Shaw, applied this analysis to the Lucent-Winstar transaction and determined
that Lucent should be considered a non-statutory insider as well.197 This case is
significant because it deemed a creditor, without actual control of the debtor,
an “insider” by focusing on the parties’ relationship and the legitimacy of the
transaction.198 This is in contrast to Lakeridge and Shaw where the courts
interpreted a narrower class of insiders while examining the same factors,
finding the “control” requirement more important and the relationshiptransaction requirement less important.
In Unencumbered Assets Trust v. JP Morgan Chase Bank (In re Nat’l
Century Fin. Enters.), the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Ohio
examined insiders under § 547 and found that a relatively liberal definition
should apply in non-statutory insider situations.199 In this case, the court sought
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Id. at *25.
Id.
193
Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Shubert (In re Winstar Commc’n., Inc..), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31137, at *7
(D. Del. Apr. 26, 2007).
194
Id.
195
Id. at *8.
196
Id. at *7–8.
197
Id. at *7.
198
See id. at *7–8.
199
See In re Nat’l Century Fin. Enters., 604 F. Supp. 2d at 1160.
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to invalidate certain cash transfers from a debtor200 under a § 547(b)(4)(B)
argument similar to the claim in Winstar.201 This court agreed that an insider is
generally “one who does not deal at arm’s length with the debtor.”202 The court
went on to cite In re Friedman, which stated that:
insider status may be based on a professional or business relationship
with the debtor ‘where such relationship compels the conclusion that
the individual or entity has a relationship with the debtor, close
enough to gain an advantage attributable simply to affinity rather
than to the course of business dealings with the parties.203

Due to such an affinity, the court in In re Nat’l Century voided a $100 million
transfer from a debtor to an insider, holding that this was “a situation that
implicates the very reason why the Bankruptcy Code has a provision for
avoiding transfers to insiders.”204
It seems clear that the competing interpretations of various courts’
construction of the non-statutory insider definition has led to starkly different
outcomes. This imprecise term leads to especially unpredictable results when a
potential insider does not meet the strict definition of a § 101(31) insider.
Surely, this outcome is not Congress’s intent and has led to opportunities for
abuse that further thwart bankruptcy’s policy goal of equitable distribution to
creditors. Additionally, the varied outcomes from courts has the potential to
lead to forum shopping.
III. A PROPOSAL: NEW STATUTORY DEFINITION OF INSIDER
This Comment argues for a new rule to be codified to address this split
among jurisdictions that has arisen due to the inconsistent judicial
interpretation of the term “insider” as defined in § 101(31). Congress should
change how an insider is defined in the Code. Insider should be defined by
removing the word “includes” from the Code205 and replacing it with “means,”
thus making the definition exclusive. Next, the Code should include a catchall

200

Id.
See 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(4)(B) (2012). This Code provision provides that transfer from a debtor to an
insider may be voided if that transfer occurred between ninety days and one year of the filing of the
bankruptcy petition. Similar to the chapter 11 voting restriction on transferring claims to insiders, this
provision is intended to prevent abuse by preventing a debtor, on the verge of bankruptcy, from transferring
assets just prior to filing.
202
In re Nat’l Century Fin. Enters., 604 F. Supp. 2d at 1161.
203
In re Friedman, 126 B.R. at 70.
204
In re Nat’l Century Fin. Enters., 604 F. Supp. 2d at 1161.
205
11 U.S.C. § 101(31) (2012).
201
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provision at the end of the definition. This new sub-paragraph “G” should
state, “any person with a close personal or financial relationship with the
debtor that, as a result of a less than arm’s length transaction, becomes
beholden to the debtor, raises a presumption that the person is an insider.”206
This argument will advance in three stages. First, I will examine
Congress’s intent in creating an insider rule by looking at the legislative
history of the term when enacted under the 1978 Code. Next, I will explain the
mechanics of this proposed rule and explain the two-step analysis courts
should use when confronted with a chapter 11 claim transfer. Finally, I will
address possible counterarguments and the continued issues that will inevitably
arise with insider determinations.
A. Examination of “Insider” Legislative Intent
The definition and application of insiders throughout the Code should meet
Congress’s intent when the term was initially adopted 1978. These intents
include: (1) to prevent bankruptcy abuse; (2) to treat similar creditors similarly;
and (3) to evenly distribute debtor assets. Courts and commentators have
uneasiness with current state of insider interpretation.207 As mentioned above,
the dissenting judge in In re Lakeridge disagreed with the majority’s
application of the facts to law.208 In his dissent, Judge Clifton agreed that a
non-statutory insider exists when there is a comparably close debtor-creditor
relationship to those enumerated in § 101(31), and the “relevant transaction is
negotiated at less than arm’s length.”209 He believed that the facts supported a
finding that there was a close Rabkin-Bartlett relationship and the transaction
was not arm’s length, thus Rabkin was an insider.
Many commentators have recommended a change, predicted abuse, or
anticipated litigation based on the conflicting interpretations issued by courts
and the non-exclusive nature of 101(31).210 In one law firm alert article titled
Ninth Circuit Issues Controversial Opinion Limiting Insider Status for
Purposes of Voting on a Chapter 11 Plan of Reorganization, the authors note
that the Lakeridge decision has “arguably provide[d] a roadmap for debtors to
circumvent the requirement in § 1129(a)(10).”211 The path for these potentially
unscrupulous debtors, according to the author, is to “simply sell their
unsecured claims for a nominal amount to friendly third parties that will vote
in favor of the plan.”212 It seems apparent that this end-run around the

206
Id. This Code section currently states that “[t]he term ‘insider’ includes—” and ends at subparagraph
F. This modified definition would add an additional subparagraph “G” as a catchall.
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requirements of chapter 11’s finely crafted cramdown procedure was likely not
Congress’s intent when enacting the Code.
A leading treatise on bankruptcy, Collier on Bankruptcy, describes
insiders, not by enumerating specific insider relationships (as does the Code),
but by focusing on the closeness of the relationship and the existence of a less
than arm’s length transaction.213 Accordingly, Congress should codify this
descriptive definition rather than attempting to narrowly define specific
examples of insiders as it currently does in the Code.214
An examination of the legislative history of the enactment of this provision
reveals support for a modified definition. Insiders are defined in § 101(31) of
the Code using the word “includes” followed by a list.215 Using rules of
statutory construction, courts have determined that the list is not exclusive216
but only illustrative, thus giving rise to statutory, or per se, insiders and nonstatutory insiders.217
The term “insider” was enacted with the 1978 Code.218 Legislative intent of
the “insider” term is relatively sparse and less than satisfactory,219 but the
Senate Report that accompanied the 1978 enactment of the Code does state a
guiding principle that an insider “is one who has a sufficiently close
relationship with the debtor that his conduct is made subject to closer scrutiny

207
See Sarah Borders, Jeffrey Dutson, Ninth Circuit Issues Controversial Opinion Limiting Insider
Status for Purposes of Voting on a Chapter 11 Plan of Reorganization, King and Spalding: Client Alert, Feb.
16, 2016.
208
In re Vill. at Lakeridge, LLC, 814 F.3d at 1003.
209
Id.
210
See Rebecca Revich, The KERP Revolution, 81 AM. BANKR. L.J. 87, 2007.
211
Sarah Borders, Jeffrey Dutson, Ninth Circuit Issues Controversial Opinion Limiting Insider Status for
Purposes of Voting on a Chapter 11 Plan of Reorganization, King and Spalding: Client Alert, Feb. 16, 2016.
212
Id.
213
In re U.S. Medical, Inc., 531 F.3d at 1277 (citing 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, ¶ 547.03[6] (Allen N.
Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds., 15th rev. ed. 2008)).
214
11 U.S.C. §101(31) (2012).
215
Id.
216
Borders, supra note 211.
217
In re Kunz, 489 F.3d 1072 (quoting Miller Avenue Professional & Promotional Serv. v. Brady (In re
Enterprise Acquisition Partners), 319 B.R. 626, 631 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2004)).
218
See 11 U.S.C. § 101(31) (2012); see also S. REP. 95-989 at 25 (stating that the term “insider” is new
for the 1978 enactment of the Code). This year saw the codification the Code largely as it is today, and with
such a large Code, the legislative reports accompanying its enactment for the most part give only basic
background information and intent.
219
Kenneth N. Klee, Legislative History of the New Bankruptcy Law, 28 DEPAUL L. REV. 941, 959–60
(1978).
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than those dealing at arm’s length with the debtor.”220 Although Congress
chose to define insiders in this way in their committee report, Congress chose
to enact the Code provision differently.221
Rather than using a descriptive definition, Congress instead defined insider
using an inclusive list as examples, explaining later in the Senate Report that
some provisions are “open-ended because the term[s] [are] not susceptible of
precise specification.”222 Thus, Congress intentionally left the courts with the
ability to determine what relationships are sufficient to meet the insider status
by “us[ing] the characterization provided in this definition.”223
Congress’s purpose of including insiders in the Code was to reach a broad
scope of persons who are not true creditors of the debtor, but are instead “alter
egos” of the creditor and therefore will not act in the best interest of other
similarly situated creditors.224 Congress defined insiders in such a way that left
significant discretion for the courts to craft and develop the body of insider
law.225 Courts have significantly departed from Congress’s intent and thereby
created a confusing and non-uniform body of law that may only be corrected
by modifying the Code.226
B. Mechanics of Proposed Definition’s Application
Accordingly, § 101(31) should be changed in two ways. First, Congress
should remove the “includes” language from the definition of insiders to make
the definition exclusive, thus removing all “non-statutory” discussion. Second,
the Code should include a catch-all provision at the end of the definition that
provides a statutory analytical framework for determining if a person is an
insider.
1. An Exclusive Insider Definition
Much of the litigation surrounding insider determination occurs because
the Code is defined using an inclusive rather than an exclusive definition,

220

See 11 U.S.C. § 101(31) (2012); see also S. REP. 95-989 at 25.
See 11 U.S.C. § 101(31) (defining “insiders” differently than they described “insiders.”).
222
S. REP. 95-989 at 35 (explaining that there are a number of Code provisions that are left open-ended,
such as “security,” “entity,” “insider,” and “person.”).
223
Id.
224
In re Blaine Richards & Co., 10 B.R. 424, 432 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y 1981).
225
See 11 U.S.C. § 101(31) (2012) (Congress’s use of the words “includes” created this discretion).
226
Compare In re Vill. at Lakeridge, LLC, 814 F.3d 993, with In re Three Flint Hill Ltd. P’ship, 213
B.R. 292 (two courts come to opposite conclusions based on very similar facts).
221
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which creates two categories of insiders.227 Much of the debate and uncertainty
that goes along with non-statutory insiders would be avoided by making the
definition exclusive and thereby eliminating the non-statutory distinction
altogether. Under this proposed modification, this change would remove some
of this uncertainty by making every would-be insider a “statutory” insider and
focus the courts on examining the relationship of the parties and the nature of
the transaction, which more aligns with Congress’s original intent.228 This
change can be effectuated by changing the word “includes” to “means.”229
2. The Statutory Catchall and its Application
The second, and more significant, change is to add a catchall provision
(becoming subsection “G”) at the end of the definition, which should state:
“any person with close personal or financial relationships with the debtor that,
as a result of a less than arm’s length transaction, becomes beholden to the
debtor, raises a presumption that the person is an insider.” This portion of the
definition can be divided into three subparts and applied in three steps.
a. The Close Relationship Test
The first step of analysis under this Comment’s proposed Code definition
is showing evidence of a close personal or financial relationship creating a
creditor that is beholden to the debtor. The fact-intensive inquiry would allow
courts some flexibility to determine what type of financial and personal
relationship should be sufficient to raise a concern about a potential insider
status. This inquiry should focus on the nature of the relationship—whether
business, personal, or mixed—between the creditor and debtor, the length of
the relationship, and the course of dealings between the parties, amongst
others. This inquiry should be relatively inclusive and broad in order to catch
as many purported insiders as possible.
This notion that the suspect relationship could be broad is supported in In
re Locke Mill Partners, where the court noted that insider status should apply
to a potentially broad range of parties.230 Keeping this inquiry relatively broad
in scope is appropriate because Congress intended a relatively broad scope
when enacting this definition in the 1978 Code.231 Casting a wide net at this
227
228
229
230
231

In re Kunz, 489 F.3d at 1075.
See 11 U.S.C. § 101(31) (2012); see also S. REP. 95-989 at 25.
See 11 U.S.C. § 101(31) (2012).
In re Locke Mill Partners, 178 B.R. 697, 702 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 1995).
See S. REP. 95-989 at 35.
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step will also allow the courts to move on to steps two and three of the analysis
where the real substance of the test lies. Furthermore, this is appropriate
because the initial burden will be on the party challenging the transaction
(most often the creditor) and thus that party will have to provide evidence that
this pre-existing relationship legitimately raises some kind of conflict of
interest.
Another key requirement at this step is that the relationship and the
transaction in question must combine to make the claim holding creditor
beholden to the debtor. If a person with this pre-existing relationship accepts a
claim from a debtor that is akin to what the Lakeridge dissent considered
“doing a favor for a friend,” then they must be deemed to be beholden to the
debtor.232 This analysis overlaps with the next step and will provide the court
with a link between the relationship of the parties and the specific transaction
being challenged.
b. The Less Than Arm’s Length Transaction Test
Part two of the rule requires the party claiming that an insider should exist
provide a factual basis to support a finding that a less than arm’s length
transaction took place. The Lakeridge dissent looked to Black’s Law
Dictionary and defined an arm’s length transaction as “1. A transaction
between two unrelated and unaffiliated parties. 2. A transaction between two
parties, however closely related they may be, conducted as if the parties were
strangers, so that no conflict of interest arises.”233 This fact-intensive inquiry is
indeed the main crux of the new definition because the prevention of abuse,
through fraudulent claim selling to a friendly third-party, is the primary goal of
this change. A less than arm’s length transaction in an insider context would be
any transaction between a debtor and a claim-purchasing creditor where a
potential conflict of interest arises. To determine whether a conflict of interest
arises in an insider context, courts examine the motives of the parties when
entering into the transaction234 and the price paid for the claim.235
Bankruptcy courts have considered non-arm’s length transactions in the
insider context and have developed one relatively straightforward definition.236

232

In re Vill. at Lakeridge, LLC, 814 F.3d at 1003–04.
Id. at 1005 (citing Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014)).
234
See In re Three Flint Hill L.P., 213 B.R. at 301.
235
See In re Vill. at Lakeridge, LLC, 813 F.3d 993 (dissent states that $5,000 paid for a claim worth
over $2 million raised a concern about the legitimacy of the transaction).
236
In re Three Flint Hill L.P., 213 B.R. at 299.
233
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In In re Three Flint Hill L.P., the Maryland bankruptcy court defined an arm’s
length transaction as “one entered into in good faith in the ordinary course of
business by unrelated parties with independent interests.”237 In In re Three
Flint Hill, a business associate (Tarrant) of the debtor (Three Flint Hill)
purchased $123,000 of debt claims to help the debtor get their chapter 11 plan
approved.238 The bankruptcy court and the district court found that Tarrant was
an insider of Three Flint Hill because the claims were purchased to help out a
friend rather than as a “carefully reasoned business decision.”239 When facts
like these are present, they indicate that the motives of the parties are selfseeking, rather than seeking to maximize the distribution of the debtor’s estate,
and thus not arm’s length.
c. The Rebuttable Presumption of Insider Status
Part three of this new catchall insider definition is the creation of a
rebuttable presumption of insider status. Under this proposed definition, once a
transfer meets the two-part (relationship and transaction) test laid out above,
there would be a presumption of insider status. This presumption (that the
transferee is an insider) would shift the burden to the debtor to show sufficient
evidence of: (1) a lack of a sufficiently close relationship; (2) that the
transaction was conducted at arm’s length; or (3) other evidence to remove the
taint of the transaction. Currently, the burden rests with the party challenging
the transaction (usually a creditor), to show that the alleged insider deal was
less than arm’s length.240 Ideally, the party with the best ability to prove or
disprove a claim (i.e., the one with the best access to the evidence) should
logically have the burden of proof.
This proposed burden shifting is appropriate because in bankruptcy cases
like these, specifically in the claim selling and voidable transfer contexts, the
party transferring a claim to a purported insider has the best knowledge of
whether that individual is an insider, so it stands to reason that the burden of
disproving insider status should remain with that party.241 Such evidence could
include information about the nature of the relationship between the parties,
the conduct of the transaction, or any other evidence that could prevent a court

237

Id. at 300 (quoting In re Valley Steel Corp., 182 B.R. 728, 735 (W.D.Va.1995)).
Id. at 296.
239
Id. at 299.
240
See In re Vill. at Lakeridge, LLC, 814 F.3d at 1003 (where the court stated that U.S. Bank did not
present enough evidence to show that Rabkin was a non-statutory insider).
241
See id. at 1005 (where MBP had all of the information regarding the relationship between Bartett and
Rabkin, yet U.S. Bank had the burden of proving that Rabkin was an insider).
238
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from finding that the parties’ relationship and transaction “compels the
conclusion that the individual or entity has a relationship with the debtor, close
enough to gain an advantage attributable simply to affinity rather than to the
course of business dealings between the parties.”242
IV. BENEFITS OF PROPOSED DEFINITION AND COUNTERARGUMENTS
This Code modification will better meet Congress’s goals of reducing
bankruptcy abuse, providing equitable distribution of the debtor’s assets, and
reducing the possibility of forum shopping by debtors.
A. Prevention of Chapter 11 Abuse
This modified definition should make it easier for courts to identify and
prevent bankruptcy abuse. The dissenting opinion by Judge Clifton in
Lakeridge laid bare a clear example of an abusive transfer intended to assure
plan confirmation: sell the voting power to a friendly third party for less than
fair value in exchange for a “yes” vote.243 An article published by bankruptcy
practitioners Sarah Borders and Jeffery Dutson also noted serious concerns that
debtors could “circumvent the requirements in [§] 1120(a)(10)” of the Code.244
The authors argued that the “roadmap” to securing an approval in a cramdown
was clearly laid out by the Lakeridge decision.245 They note that under the
current system insiders can “simply sell their unsecured claims for a nominal
amount to friendly third parties that will vote in favor of the plan.”246 Clearly
this scheming conduct violates Congress’s goals of maximizing the equitable
distribution of the debtor’s estate. Furthermore, this change will provide
bankruptcy courts with another tool to police the current system and fulfill
their role as supervisor of unwarranted preferential treatment.247
This definition brings every insider into the statute and gives courts a
concrete, statutorily mandated framework to determine if insider transfers are
being made. The transfer that occurred in Lakeridge would likely have been
deemed an insider transaction because it met both parts of the initial insider
test because the claim holder, Rabkin, had a significant personal and financial
relationship with Bartlett and also purchased the more than $2,000,000 claim

242
243
244
245
246
247

In re Friedman, 125 B.R. at 70.
In re Vill. at Lakeridge, LLC, 814 F.3d at 1005 (Clifton, J., dissenting).
Borders, supra note 211.
Id.
Id.
In re U.S. Medical, 531 F.3d at 1275 (quoting In re Kunz, 489 F.3d at 1077).
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for a nominal value.248 This new provision will provide a concrete tool to
enable the courts to recognize abuses and empower them to prevent similar
abuses in the future. One court has said that “the purpose of this inquiry is to
guard against collusive approval of plans by persons whose dealing with the
debtor are “at less than arm’s length.”249 This modified insider definition will
enable the courts to do this.
B. Improving Equitable Distribution
The improved definition will also ensure equitable distribution among
creditors. A major goal of the enactment of the Code, beginning as far back as
the first enactment of a national bankruptcy statute in 1898, was to protect
debtors and prevent hardships and injustices to creditors250 by providing for
equal distribution to similarly situated creditors.251 The sale of economically
unjustified claims to insider-like persons for the purpose of foisting a plan
upon other creditors defeats this longstanding goal. As the court stated in In re
U.S. Medical, one of the goals of bankruptcy law is to “prevent, within limits, a
debtor from giving preferred treatment to some creditors in derogation of the
interests of other, similarly situated creditors.”252
The proposed definition of insider will better meet these goals of equitable
distribution and equitable creditor treatment by providing a more concrete and
broad definition. A court can then better fulfill its role as supervisor to prevent
potential “unwarranted preferential treatment.”253 By analyzing the debtor’s
relationship to the claim holder the court will learn if there is an unwarranted
affinity, then by further examining the transaction itself to figure out if it was
conducted at arm’s length, the court can confirm or deny that affinity and
presume the claim holder is an insider. The initial burden of proof is
appropriately on the other claim holding creditors, as theirs is the interest being
harmed by the insider-debtor collusion. Once the presumption is triggered, the
debtor is best situated to rebut this presumption to the satisfaction of the court,
ensuring that any initial misgivings about the relationship and the transaction
were unwarranted, thereby ensuring that all creditors are being treated
equitably, thus meeting Congress’s intent.254

248
249
250
251
252
253
254

See In re Vill. at Lakeridge, LLC, 814 F.3d at 1003.
In re Three Flint Hill Ltd. P’ship, 213 B.R. at 299.
In re Nash, 249 F. 375, 377 (S.D.W.Va. 1918).
Begier v. IRS, 496 U.S. 53, 58 (1990).
In re U.S. Medical, 531 F.3d at 1275 (quoting In re Kunz, 489 F.3d at 1074–75).
Id. at 1275 (quoting In re Kunz, 489 F.3d at 1074–75).
See id. (citing In re Kunz, 489 F.3d at 1074–75 (discussing the purpose of bankruptcy law)).
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C. Prevention of Forum Shopping
The Code alteration also has the potential to prevent forum shopping by
unprincipled debtors. The Central District of California, when examining the
merits of a bankruptcy related motion,255 defined forum shopping as “a party
attempt[ing] to manipulate an action to have it heard before a forum it deems
more favorable, charitable, or sympathetic toward its point of view.”256
Assuming a debtor may have more than one choice for forum when
contemplating bankruptcy, the debtor may seek a forum with a narrow insider
definition to gain a favorable advantage.257 For example, a court that follows
the Lakeridge precedent may determine that a close friend of an insider is not a
non-statutory insider and allow that friend to purchase an unsecured claim for a
nominal value in order to force approval other claim holders. If this
hypothetical debtor intends to use a cramdown as part of a chapter 11
proceeding, they may choose the more favorable forum to manipulate an
advantage over other creditors. Under the proposed modified definition of
insider, courts will not have the same variance in their categorization of nonstatutory insiders as they do now and the effect of forum shopping for an
insider favorable court would be reduced.
All things considered, the benefits of the proposed change are potentially
significant. The change will diminish abuse of the chapter 11 bankruptcy
process by preventing less than arm’s length claim sales between friendly
parties, afford more equitable distribution of a debtor’s assets by casting a
wider insider net and thereby maximizing estate values, and reducing the
incentive for debtors to forum shop bankruptcy courts for those with favorable
interpretation of non-statutory insiders. A final benefit flowing from this
change is greater economic value to creditors. For example, in Lakeridge,
Rabkin stood to earn $55,000 on the claims he purchased from MBP if he had
sold them to U.S. Bank.258 This is considerably more than he stood to make if
he held the claims as an investment and hoped to make money as part of
Lakeridge’s plan.

255
See Gottlieb v. Landau (In re KSL Media, Inc.), No. CV 15-08748-AB, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1917,
at *6 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 6, 2016).
256
Id. at *28 (quoting Calvert v. Berg, No. C13-1019, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94874, at *5 (W.D. Wash.
July 8, 2013).
257
Compare In re Vill. at Lakeridge, LLC, 814 F.3d at 1003–04 (where the court applied a narrow
definition of insider), with In re Three Flint Hill Ltd. Pshp., 213 B.R. 2 at 299.
258
In re Vill. at Lakeridge, LLC, 814 F.3d at 998 (Rabkin was offered $50,000 and then $60,000 by U.S.
Bank for the claims he purchased for $5,000.).
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D. Counterarguments
There are three potential counterarguments for the proposed definition
change. The first is that the definition does not address the “control” aspect
identified by many courts as an important factor in determining a party’s
insider status. The second is that the change does not allow courts to have an
in-depth factual inquiry, but instead requires them to make determinations as a
matter of law, which could lead to unreasonable results. The final
counterargument is that the scope of the new definition is too broad and will
unduly harm debtors’ legitimate reorganization efforts.
Many courts have inquired into the level of “control” of the insider over
the debtor, but under this new definition such an inquiry would not be required
to classify a person or individual as a non-statutory insider.259 The Fourth
Circuit, in In re Gilbert has argued, “the alleged insider must exercise
sufficient authority over the debtor so as to unqualifiedly dictate corporate
policy and the disposition of corporate assets.”260 Other courts have disagreed
with this analysis, arguing that control is not dispositive.261 Even the Lakeridge
court believed that “[h]aving—or being subject to—some degree of control is
one of many indications that creditor may be a non-statutory insider.”262
Control should be “probative of an insider relationship,” but under the current
system and the improved definition, a finding of some level of control would
not be dispositive of insider status.263 This has generally been only one of
many factors a court will examine to bring a person into the non-statutory
category.264
The inquiry would still be enlightening under the proposed rule because the
Code will retain the “person in control of debtor” definition of insider that
applies to partnerships and corporations,265 but the “control” inquiry would not
be necessary for other entities because the existence of a personal or financial
relationship would suffice to trigger the arm’s length transaction inquiry.
Furthermore, because many courts find the level of control to be probative266

259

In re Locke Mill Partners, 178 B.R. at 701.
Butler, 72 F.3d at 443 (quoting Hunter v. Babcock (In re Babcock Dairy Co.), 70 Bankr. 662, 666
(Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1986)).
261
In re Three Flint Hill Ltd. P’shp., 213 B.R. at 299.
262
In re Vill. at Lakeridge, LLC, 814 F.3d at 1001.
263
In re Three Flint Hill Ltd. P’shp., 213 B.R. at 299.
264
In re Locke Mill Partners, 178 B.R. at 701.
265
11 U.S.C. §§ 101(31)(b)(iii), (c)(v) (2012) (a person in control of debtor is included as a specific
enumerated definition of insider under both partnerships and corporations under the current definition).
266
In re Three Flint Hill Ltd. P’shp., 213 B.R. at 299.
260
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of the relationship of the parties, this analysis would similarly apply under the
proposed relationship prong. Finally, because the insider status is initially a
rebuttable presumption, the purported insider may present evidence that
concedes control, but still shows that the transaction was negotiated “as if the
parties were strangers” and that no conflict of interest arose from the
transaction.267
A second argument against the definition change is that a court will have
less discretion to conduct a fact-intensive inquiry due to the strict statutory
criteria in the Code. The Ninth Circuit noted in Lakeridge that courts “must
conduct a fact-intensive analysis to determine if a creditor and debtor share a
close relationship and negotiated at arm’s length.”268 The court also mused that
creating statutory insider status as a matter of law could prevent a proper
factual analysis on a case-by-case basis.269 Under the proposed system, a court
will have the same factual debate over whether to include these would-be
insiders into the statutory definition, as they would non-statutory insiders.
There will still be a fact-based examination of the parties’ relationship and the
nature of the transaction with enough discretion left to the court to conclude at
either of these steps that an insider determination is unwarranted. Ultimately,
there will always be a factual debate over insider statuses, but this proposed
Code change will more clearly settle the legal debate by providing a uniform
analytical tool that will exclude a greater number of creditors if they meet the
insider catchall test.
Another counterargument is that the test will unduly harm debtors who are
legitimately trying to reorganize by limiting the pool of non-insiders. In
Lakeridge, the court worried that “a third-party assignee could be foreclosed
from voting a claim acquired from an insider, even if the entire transaction was
conducted at arm’s length.”270 This concern could stem from the fact that the
proposed definition has a relatively broad scope initially. This concern is
unjustified, however, because as the court stated in In re Friedman that, “not
every creditor-debtor relationship attended by a degree of personal interaction
between the parties rises to the level of an insider relationship.”271 Under the
new definition the courts will retain the same discretion to determine what
relationships are worthy of an insider determination. Furthermore, even if a
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court finds a close creditor-debtor relationship, if the parties negotiated the
transaction at arm’s length, then the insider analysis will end at this step.
The concern of harming legitimate debtors will be minimal under the new
framework. This Comment’s proposed definitional change should only affect a
relatively small set of creditors because the change is designed to affect
chapter 11 insiders who have a pre-existing personal or financial relationship
and conduct a less than arm’s length transaction. Without both elements of (1)
a pre-existing close relationship and (2) a subsequent transfer, there is no
trigger of this definitional provision. And even if the insider definition fits
initially, the would-be insider may rebut the presumption by presenting any
evidence it has that the deal was legitimate. The Lakeridge court’s anxiety, that
a party could statutorily become an insider without a less than arm’s length
claim sale, would be negated under the proposed definition.272 Any debtor
trying to legitimately reorganize can sell the claim to another unrelated entity,
sell the claim for full and fair consideration, or maintain the sale to the insider
and exclude that insider’s vote under the cramdown rules.273
The definitional change is designed to catch insiders such as Rabkin in
Lakeridge, who purchased claims under questionable circumstances after his
long standing relationship with a Bartlett had been established.274 This
modification will leave out the common unsecured creditor who still associates
with a debtor, including accountants, lawyers, and other professionals who
have not engaged in such transactions.275 The definitional change would not
cast a net so large that it deems any person with a preexisting relationship to be
an insider. Much like in In re Blaine Richards & Co., where an accountant of a
debtor was not considered to be an insider, the relationship itself does not
establish insider status, but rather triggers a closer look when there is a
subsequent transaction.276
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, this Comment argues for a change in how the Code defines
an “insider” in § 101(31).277 This Comment proposes that the Code be
modified from its current inclusive definition to one that is exclusive. The new
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definition should conclude with a final catchall provision that is designed to
reach and examine a broad spectrum of insiders. This catchall should read as
follows: “insider means . . . any person with close personal or financial
relationships with the debtor that, as a result of a less than arm’s length
transaction, becomes beholden to the debtor, raises a presumption that the
person is an insider.”
The modified Code provision will settle the disagreement among courts
between broad and narrow definitions of non-statutory insiders by bringing
many non-statutory insiders into the statutory frame. Currently the state of
insider law is confusing, non-uniform, and subject to significant abuse. Some
courts apply a narrow construction of the current definition, thus allowing
persons who intuitively should be insiders to vote to approve plans that force
unwanted cramdown restructuring plans on unwilling creditors.278 Other courts
however, apply a broad interpretation to insiders, thus bringing more
individuals into the statutory scope and limiting the voting power of these
insiders for plan approval.279
This broad interpretation is more appropriate to properly meet Congress’s
intent and bankruptcy’s greater goals. Many courts have recognized the
importance of the Code’s goal of equitable distribution, which in large part
requires that similarly situated creditors receive fair treatment and that debtors
are prevented from “giving preferred treatment to some creditors in derogation
of the interests other[s].”280 The proposed definition includes a relatively broad
insider definition to meet these goals, while also maintaining safeguards, such
as the required two part analysis and rebuttable presumption, to prevent
unnecessary insider determinations.
The new definition will provide the courts with a uniform statutory
framework for analyzing chapter 11 claim transfers that will provide
bankruptcy judges and businesses with better guidance when considering
potential insider transfers such as the one in Lakeridge.281 Also, the new
provision will prevent economically unjustified transfers of claims to any
parties that have a pre-existing close relationship with a debtor. Congress has
made clear its intention to prevent closely related parties from making deals
278
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that undercut legitimate creditors in chapter 11 cases, just because a debtor’s
insider does not clearly fall within the current statutory frame should not allow
these persons to force restructuring plans on unwilling creditors.282
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